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PUBLIC  AND PRIVATE  INFLUENCES  ON RESERVE
REQUIREI,IEMS  IN  A  THEORY OF  REGUi.ATION
The inverse  relation  between  lnterest  rates  and cornrnercial bank  legal
"excess"  reserves  is  well  knorm.  It  is  unambiguous theoretically  ("a  bank
holding  excess  reserwes  bears  an opportunity  cost  whlch  is  represented  by  the
yield  it  could  have  obtained  by  holding  its  funds  in  another  form."1)  and  it
has  often  been validated  ernpirically.2  The relatj.onship  between  interest
rates  and  "required"  teserves  has  received  less  attention.3  In  fact  the  most
important  determinant  of  required  reserves  --  required  reserve  lglELgE --  are
universally  ureated  in  monetary  policy  rnodels as  exogenous,  or  at  least  as
completely  controlled  by  the  monetary  authority  in  light  of  macroeconomic
goals. a  Yet  the  incentiwes  for  banks  to  lighten  the  burden  of  required
reserves  are  at  least  as  great  as  for  excess  reserves,  They nay  ewen be
greater  because  required  reserves  are  for  banks  less  useful  than  excess
reserves  since,  as  indlcated  by  their  self  -  contradictory  name, they  do not
function  as  reserves;  they  may not  be used  to  neet  deposit  outflows.5  But
changes  in  required  reserves  rnus  t  also  take  account  of  the  (possibly  contrary)
incentiwes  of  other  economic agents,  principally  Congress and  the  Federal
Reserve  System.
Since  requlred  reserves  are  largely  deteruined  by  regulation  under  law,
it  is  appropriate  to  attenpt  to  explain  them in  the  context  of  recelved
OFtheories  of  regulation.  The commercial  banking  industry  presents  an
interesting  combination  of  the  t\so main  theories  of  economic regulation.  The
"public  interest"  theory  of  bank  regulation  is  based  on  the  need  for  a  stable
monetary  system,  lrhich  requires  safe  and  sound banks  and  fuoplLes retulatory
linits  on  the  risks  undertaken  by  bank  managers siDce  it  is  felt  that  those
risks  impose  greater  potential  costs  on society  than  the  risks  underlaken  by
other  firrns.6  The  "capture"  theory  of  bank  regulation  helps  to  explain  the
official  beneflts  that  have,  from  time  to  time,  been conferred  on  the
industry,  such  as  lirnlts  on entry  and a  governnent- supervised  price-fixing
arrangement  in  the  form  of  maxinr.m lnterest  payable  on  deposits.
Consequently,  the  study  of  the  promulgation  and administration  of  regulations
affecting  comrnercial  banks  is  a means of  verifying  or  rejecting  some of  the
empirical  implications  of  the  capture  theory  (as  suggested  by  George Stigler
[1971]  and formalized  by  Sarn  Peltznan  [1976])  uodified  by pubLic  interest
considerations  and  the  recognition  that  regulators  are  also  an  interest
group .  7
According  to  the  Stigle  r /PeLtzman  theory,  the  regulator  maximizes
political  support  by  irnposing  regulations  up  to  the  point  ac  which  the
expected  rnarginal  gain  in  support  fron  the  beneficiaries  equals  the  expected
marginal  reduction  in  support  from  the  losers.  In  the  six0ple  case  of
homogenous groups  of  beneficiarles  and losers,  the  expected  polttical  gain  is
the  increase  in  the  probability  of  support  from  each beneficiary  as  a  function
of  its  gain  in  wealth  tines  the  number of  beneficiaries  (vice  versa  in  the
case of  an expected pol-itical  loss).  This  implies  that,  since  the
redistributive  effects  of  a  regul-ation  are  likely  to  vary  wi.th  economic
conditions,  its  terms will  be adjusted  in  tesponse to  those  conditions.  Forexample,  the  interest  ceilings  on deposits  becane uore  onerous  to  depositors
as  other  interest  rates  rose  during  the  1950s and  1970s without  becoulng
correspondingLy  rnore profitabLe  to  banks,  which  devoted  increasing  resources
to  sometiues  complicated  ways of  competing  for  deposits.s  The difference
betlreen  the  costs  of  automatic  tfansfer  services,  nultlplication  of  branches,
attractive  surroundings,  and gifts  in  lieu  of  interest,  on the  one hand,  and
the  utility  of  equivalent  monetary  pa)ments  to  deposltors,  on  the  other  hand,
represented  a  deadweight  loss  of  these  regulattons  vrhich  led  to  thelr  demlse.9
Their  abandonment l/as  gradual.  The Federal  Reserve  and other  regulators
increasingly  ninked  at  patently  illegal  ewaslons  under  pressure  fron  Congress
and the  larger  banks,  which  desired  a more competitive  pricing  system,  until,
for  all  but  the  smallest  depositors,  the  celllngs  had become  ineffectlve.l0
The public's  rejection,  with  regulatory  approval,  of  interest  ceilings  was
forrnally  accepted  by  Congress  in  the  Depository  Institutions  Deregulations  Act
of  1980 after  the  courts  had  dellvered  an ultimatum  in  the  form  of  a  decision
that  several  importan!  evasions  were  illegal  under  existing  law,11  In
retrospect  lt  appears  that  lega1  interest  ceillngs  rrere  allowed  to  exLst  only
a  little  while  after  they  had becone binding,  which  reninds  us  of  the  question
that  Stiglet  and  Friedlander  [1962]  answered  ln  the  negative  for  electricity:
"What can  regulators  regulate  ?  "  12
But  why reserve  requirements  exlst  and whether  they  are  effective  are
rnore difficult  quesLlons  to  answer  than  those  relating  to  interest  ceilings,
and  the  range  of  plausible  answers pernit  contradiction  as  easily  as
confirmation  of  the  S  tigter  -  Friedlander  conclusion.  In  the  first  plaee  it  has
to  be  noted  that,  unlike  low  interest  rates  and electricity  prices,  there  is
no private  group  with  a  direct  interest  in  large  required  reserves.  By  lawthey  may not  serve  a  reserve  functl-on,  and they  are  clearly  inferior  to  short-
lern  Treasury  securities  because  they  do not  enhance bank  eapital.  In
contrast,  the  increased  value  of  deposits  resulting  from  reductions  ln
required  reserves  directly  benefits  banks  and their  custoners.
So a plausible  explanation  of  requlred  reserves  must  depend on  larger
social  or  nacroecononic  goals,  of  which  there  are  or  have been  at  least  four:
reductions  in  the  cost  of  servicing  the  federal  debt  and  in  the  volatllltles
of  the  money stock  and the  price  level,  and greater  Federal  Reserve  control  of
money and credit.  Obviously  these  goals  are  not  lndependent.  With  regard  to
the  first,  reserve  requirements  found  their  way into  federal  legislation  in
the  National  Currency  Act  of  1863,  Irhich  provided  for  the  chartering  of
"national'r  banks  by  the  Conptroller  of  the  Currency.  fhis  Act  was one of  a
series  of  neasures  designed  to  facilltate  war  firianee,  including  the
suspension  of  specie  payments,  issues  of  legal  tender  greenbacks,  and  a  tax  on
state  bank  notes  which  drove  those  issues  out  of  existence.  The new national
banks  were  empowered to  issue  notes  on  the  secuflty  of  United  States  bonds
with  par  walue  equal  to  ninety  percent  of  the  walue  of  the  notes.  In
addition,  national  banks  were  required  "at  all  times  [to]  have  on hand,  in
lawful  rnoney of  the  United  States,  an amount equaL to  at  Least  twenty- five  per
centurn  [in  reserve  cities;  fifteen  elsewhere ]  of  the  aggregate  amount of  its
notes  in  circulation  and its  deposits."13
Second,  it  has  often  been pointed  out  that  wariations  in  the  money
stock,  due  to  variations  in  bank  demands for  excess  reserves  and  the  non-bank
public's  relative  currency-  depos  it  dernands, would  be  lessened  by  higher
required  reserve  ratios,14  In  the  llnit,  a 100 percent  reserve  fatLo  fendets
the  money stock  lndependenc  of  fluctuations  in  currency  demand --  anobservation  upon which  the  "Chicago  plan"  for  banking  reform  was based
following  the  large  currency  withdrar,rals  of  the  early  1930s.15
Third,  ln  1932 the  Federal  Reserve  Co mittee  on Bank Reserves  proposed
the  abolitlon  of  distinctlons  between t)Tes  and locations  of  deposits  (i.e.,
between  time  and demand deposits,  arid between  central  reserve  ci-ty,  reserve
city,  and country  banks)  since,  it  was believed,  these  distinctions
contributed  to  the  instability  of  noney.  In  their  place  a  structure  of
reserve  requirements  was proposed  which  would  ',!ake  into  account  ,..  the
activity  as well  as  the  volume  of  the  deposits  held  by  each  indlvidual  rnember
bank,  '^rithout  regard  to  the  locatlon  of  the  bank  or  the  terx0s of  withdrawal  on
which  the  deposlts  are  technlcally  held.  "  Specifically,  each bank  should  "be
required  to  hold  a  reserve  equivalent  to  (a)  5 percent  of  its  total  net
deposits,  plus  (b)  50 percent  of  the  average  daily  withdrawal  actually  made
from  all  of  its  deposit  accounts. "  [Federal  Reserve  Board Annual  Report  J-933,
p.Z62l  In  other  wotds,  reserve  requirements  should  vary  directly  with  the
velocity  of  money (or  at  least  of  the  largest  and most  active  part  of  Lhe
noney  stock),  so  that  the  impact  of  veloclty  on  inflation  would  be  reduced.
Fourth,  almost  as  soon as  they  got  underway,  Federal  Reserve  officials
began  to  argue  for  the  authority  to  use variations  in  requlred  reserve  fatios
as  an  instrunent  of  credit  control.lo  They obtained  that  authority  in  the
Banking  Act  of  1935 and used  it  wigorously  berween  1936 and the  early  1950s.
Three  of  these  rational  izations  of  reserve  requirements  suggest  a  direct
relationship  \,rith  lnteres!  rates.  The Treasury,s  incentive  to  push  for  high
requirements  rises  \^7ith the  costs  of  debt  service.  and  the  reconmendation  of
the  1932 cornmittee  irnplies  a  similar  relationship  if  the  velocity  of  noney  is
dlrectly  related  to  interest  rates  as  suggested  by  rnost of  the  theoretical  andenpirical  literature  on  the  demand for  rnoney.17  Federal  Reserve  officials
ignored  the  recomendation  nade by  the  Federal  Reserve  conmittee  on Bank
Reserves  and  instead  pushed  suceessfully  for  discretionary  changes  in  reserve
ratios  (whlch  continued  to  be  distinguished  by  r)rpe and  Location  of  deposir);
but  bank  loans,  prices,  output,  and  interest  rates  are  all  procycllcal
variables,  so  that  the  use  of  teserve  requirenents  as  an  instrument  of
stabilizatlon  still  suggests  a positive  relatlon  betvreen those  requlrernents
and interest  rates.18
The observed  inverse  correlati-on  betr{reen required  reserve  ratios,  as
well  as  total  reserve  ratios,  and  interest  rates,  shordn  in  Figure  1,  suggescs
that  direct  and  selfish  private  goals  have  acted  more powerfully  than  ideal
but  distant  and perhaps  unattainable  public  goals  on  official  declsions
regarding  reserve  requirenents.  posner  has  argued  that  a  leason  for  lhe
frequent  failure  of  regulation  ls  'the  intractable  character  of  nany  of  the
tasks  that  have  been  assigned  to  the  regulatory  agencies"  tI974l.  He was
discussing  price  regulations  in  particular  lndustries,  but  his  argument
carries  even  greater  force  in  the  realn  of  macroeconomic policy,  where  the
Federal  Reserve  is  supposed to  "provide  for  a  safer  and roore flexible  banking
and monetary  system'  and to  play  a  leading  role  in  the  achlevernent  of
"stability  and growth  of  the  economy, a high  level  of  emplo)rment, stabili.ty  in
the  purchasing  power  of  the  dollar,  and  reasonable  balance  in  transactions
with  foreign  countries
changes  and these  objectives  are  dimly  understood  and ofLen  remote.  So when
interest  rates  rise,  the  Federal  Reserve,s will  to  ralse  teserve  fequlrements
lacks  strength  and  is  likely  to  bend under  the  pressure  of  politically
influential  groups  that  benefit  from  low  reserve  requirements.  In  thelanguage  of  the  Stigler  /PeLtzmar' rnodel,  the  expected  gain  in  political  support
for  uhe Fed ftom  banks  and depositors  as  the  result  of  a  reduction  in  reserve
requirements  is  clear  and direct  and  is  verified  by  extenslve  lobbying;
whereas  the  expected  loss  of  support  in  the  event  that  the  reduction  is
inconsistent  with  rnacroeconomic goals  must be heavlly  discounted  because  that
loss  is  remote  in  tirne  and uncertaln  of  occurfence.
The remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II  presents
a  chronology  of  reserve  ratlos  and  interest  rates  since  1860.  A nodel  of
optimal  bank  reserve  responses  to  interest  rates  is  developed  and estinated  in
Section  III.  Some lnplications  of  our  results  for  monetary  research  are
presented  in  Section  IV.
II.  RESERVES,  REQU]RED  RESERVES,  AND  INTEREST  RATES:  1860-1989
State  legislators'  arguments  for  reserve  fequirements  durlng  the  years
before  the  Ciwil  l.Iar were  like  the  aldernan's  demand that  cab  conpanies  keep
at  least  one car  at  every  tax!  rank  because he  could  nnever  get  a  cab."  A
typieal  example was the  decision  of  Massachusetts  to  ix0pose a  fifteen  Dercent
specie  reserve  on deposlts  and notes  in  1858 after  the  Joint  Connittee  on
Banks and Banklng  found  rhat  banks  kept  too  little  cash  against  the
possibility  of  withdrawals.20  Laws such  as  this  prowided  precedents  for
Treasury  Secretary  Chase in  his  search  for  ways  to  finance  the  Civil  War.  The
National  Bank Act  of  1853 was strongly  opposed,  but  after  early  defeats,  lt
finally  passed  Congress by  narrow  marglns,  anidst  appeals  to  patriotlsm  as  a
war measure.2l
The Act  established  a  Currency  Bureau with  a  chief  officer  called  the
Cornptroller  of  the  Currency  subject  to  the  general  dlfectlon  of  the  Secretaryof  the  Treasury,  The Bureau's  nain  functions  were  to  charter  and  supervlse
"national"  banks.  However,  nost  banks  preferred  to  retain  their  state
charters  because  of,  arnong  other  reasons,  the  higher  reserve  requirements  of
national  banks.  Most  national  banks  were  required  to  keep  reserves  equal- to
15 percent  of  notes  and deposits.  These  "country"  banks,  as  they  were  later
designated,  had  to  keep  two-fifths  of  their  reserves  as  vault  cash but  night
deposit  the  rest  with  correspondent  banks  in  ,,redernptlonr,  (later  called
"reserve"  or  "central  reserve")  cities.  Banks in  the  17 redernption  cities  had
a  25 percent  reserve  requlrement.  New York  City  banks  were  required  to  keep
their  entire  reserve  as wault  cash,  while  those  in  the  other  16 redemption
cities  could  keep  up  to  three-fifths  of  thelr  requlred  reserves  as  deposits  in
national  banks  ln  New York.  These requirenents  are  shown at  the  top  of  Table
1.  In  contrast,  only  a  few  states  inposed  reserve  requirements  and,  of  those
that  did,  the  requirements  were  less  stringent  than  for  national  banks;  the
requirements  as  percentages  of  note  and deposlt  llablllties  were  usually  less
(partly  because  time  deposits  were  giwen  lower  requirements  than  demand
deposits)  and  states  were  more lenient  in  counting  interbank  balances  as
reserves.22  The latter  difference  was important  because  interest  was corulonly
paid  on these balances.
Sectetary  Chase and  Cornptroller  McCulloch  sought  to  offset  the
unattractive  features  of  national  chartefs  by  creating  a  tax  differential  on
the  notes  of  state  banks  so  severe  that  those  banks  would  be  forced  to
transfer  to  national  status,  and  in  March 1865 Congress  levled  a  tax  of  l0
percent  per  annum on  state  bank  notes,  compared with  3 percent  on notes  of
national  banks.23  Two-thirds  of  state  banks  immediately  shifted  to  national
charcers.  The percentage  of  banks  with  natLonal  chafters  rose  frorn  30  ln  JuneL864  (461  of  1556)  to  79  in  June  1865  (L294  of  1643),  and peaked  ar  88  in
1873, after  which  it  feLl  steadily  to  73 ln  1885, 42 in  1900, and 35 in  l-913.
The percentage  of  bank  assets  in  national  banks  feII  frorn  91  in  1873 to  73  in
1913.24
The resurgence  of  state  banks  was due largely  to  the  growth  of  deposit
banking,  which  rendered  the  tax  on bank  notes  irrelevant.  The Currency  Bureau
feared  the  same fate,  and the  40 years  after  1873 saw a  series  of  regulacory
decisions  and  legislative  enactments  intended  to  relLewe  national  banks  of
some of  their  disadvantages.  In  1874 reserves  against  notes  were  lowered  to  5
percent  (to  be  kept  in  cash wirh  rhe  Treasury),  and  in  1887 rhe  Conprroller
was given  authority  to  increase  the  nurnbers of  "central  reserve  cities"
(previously  limited  to  Nerr york)  and  ,'reserve  cities,"  forrnerly  called
redemption  cities.  The latter  change was sought  by  banks  that  wanted  the
opportunity  to  cornpete for  the  required  reserve  portion  of  bankers,  balances
in  smaller  clties  ,2s
Reserve  requirenents  for  national  banks  in  central  reserve  and reserve
cities  and elsewhere  (the  ,,country"  banks)  are  presented  in  Table  l.  AIso
shown is  an estimate  of  the  actual  cash  reserve  ratio  for  the  entire  banklng
system  (A/D.),  where A  is  vault  cash  plus  (after  1913)  bank  balances  with  the
Federaf  Reserve,  and D. is  the  bank  deposit  component of  the  broad  money
supply  (i.e.,  demand  deposits  except  interbank  and U.S.  government accounrs,
less  cash  icems  in  the  process  of  collection,  plus  tiroe  deposits  and. other
short-term  liabilities).26  An adequate estimate  of  the  overall  required  cash
reserve  ratio  is  awailable  for  only  part  of  the  banking  system  --  Federal
Resetve  member  banks  --  and only  since  1929.  A,  ls  required  reserves  of
rnember  banks,  and Dn is  member  bank  deposits  subjeet  to  reserve  requirementsunder Federal  Reserve regulations  (i.e.,  deposits  less  demand  deposits  due
from  other  banks  and  less  cash  items  in  the  process  of  collection).  The last
column  shows the  4-5  month corunercial  paper  rate,  R.  A/Da,  Ar/Dn,  and R are
shown  for  June  in  the  year  irnmediately  following  each  change  in  national
required  Teserve ratios  and assorted  other  years.  Comparable  data  (i.e,,  for
the  same dates  each year)  are  available  only  frorn  1882.  The ratio  A/D"  is  nor
ideal  frorn  the  standpoint  of  bank  reserve  demands  (which  presumabJ-y  depend  on
bankers'  and goverrunent deposits),  but  it  correspond.s wlth  the  ratio  used  in
conwentional  money  -  nultiplier  analysis.  +/Dn  rr,ay  change because  of  changes
in  the  required  ratios  listed  !n  Table  l,  and also  because  of  shifts  in  the
relative  importance  of  central  reserve  city,  reserve  city,  and country  banks,
as well  as  in  the  relative  sizes  of  tlrne  and d.emand  deposics,  A/D.  rnay change
for  these  reasons  and also  because  of  changes  in  required  reserve  ratios  of
non-member state  banks  and shifts  in  the  relative  amounts of  deposits  subject
to  national  and  the  various  state  reserve  requirements.
In  his  annual  report  for  1894,  Tteasury  Secretary  6ar1is1e  proposed  the
repeal  of  reserve  requirenents  against  deposits  on  the  grounds  that:
To prowide  for  a  reserve  which
cannot  be  utilized  even at  a  tine  of  the
greatest  stringency  and distrust  without
incurring  the  penalties  of  forfeiture,
affords  a roost striking  illustration  of
the  inpolicy  of  legislative  interference
with  the  natural  laws  of  trade  and
finance  .  27
The last  legislated  change in  reserve  requiremenls  before  the  Federal
Reserve  Act  came in  the  Aldrich-Vreeland  Act  of  190g,  which,  in  addition  co
Providing  for  the  emergency issue  of  noues  secufed. by  private  and nunicipal
securities,  eliminated  reserve  requirements  on governnent  d.epostts.  The
Iatter  provision  formalized  a  1902 decision  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury
10(following  the  financial  stringency  and rash  of  bank  failures  during  the  "rich
man's panic  of  L901').  It  was rewersed by  the  Banking Act  of  1935.
The incldence  of  reserve  requirements  also  varied  with  the  assiduousness
of  the  regulators.  Thornas  Kane,  long-time  officlal  of  the  Currency  Bureau
(Secretary  to  uhe Couptroller,  1885-99,  and Deputy  -  Comptroller,  L899-L923)
wrote  that  in  1908
probably  seventy-five  percent  of  the  examiners'  reports,  and about  the
same percentage  of  reports  of  condition  nade by  the  banks,  disclosed
violations  of  law  of  one kind  or  another,  rnaking it  necessary  to  write
letters  to  that  number of  banks.  [Kane, 1922, p.366]
But  Lawrence Murray,  Cornptroller  from  1908 to  1913,  did  not  believe  all
these  letters  to  be necessary.
At  a  dinner  given  in  Ner,r  York  City  in  L909,  in  Mr.  Murray,s  honor,
by  a prorninent  banket,  at  ruhich a number of  bankers  were  present,  he
rnade a brief  address  in  which  he  reviewed  the  reforns  that  he had
inaugurated  in  the  adrninistration  of  the  Comptroller,s  office,  and
others  that  he  contemplated  making.  Upon hls  return  to  Washlngton,  in
referring  to  this  dinner,  he nade  the  statement  that  what  most  pleased
the  bankers  who were  present  on that  occasion  was hi-s  statement  that  he
did  not  intend  to  write  them any annoying  letLers  crLticlzing  non-
essentials  in  the  managenent of  their  banks;  and he  gave  directions  to
the  office  force  that  no  letters  should  be wrltten  to  the  banks  which
were  calculated  to  annoy  them,. , ,
As a reason for  not  criticizing  deficiencies  Ln reserve,  Mr.
Murray  stated  that  the  United  States  was the  only  country  in  the  worLd
that  had  such  a  foolish  law,  that  the  banks  complained  of  its  hardship,
and  that  he  did  not  propose  to  require  them to  observe  it.  He stated
further  in  regard  to  this  provision  of  law  that  it  was not  necessary  to
call  the  attention  of  banks  to  a  shortage  in  reserve,  of  to  require  them
to  make the  defLciency  good,  as  they  knew the  law  as well  as  the
Comptroller,  and knew when they  were violating  it....
Money borrowed  by  one bank  frorn  another,  largely  in  excess  of  the
legal  lirnit  and concealed  by  subterfuges  in  one  form  or  another,  was not
allowed  to  be r,/ritten  on,  for  the  reason,  Mr.  Murray  stated,  that  "the
business  of  this  country  cannot  be  carried  on by  any hard  and fast  laws.
The banks must be given  some  latitude...  ."
In  his  supervi-sion  of  the  banks,  Mr.  Murray  seemed to  be  governed
by  the  rule  of  action  which  he rdas  heard  frequently  to  express,  that,
"It  is  ahtays best  to  pursue the  course  of  least  resistance".  [Kane,
L922, pp.368-7Ll
1',]This  account  of  changes and proposed  changes  in  reserve  requirements
closely  follows  the  standard  list  of  pre-World  Har  I  flnanclal  crises,
speciflcally  the  panics  of  1873, 1884, 1893, and L907.28  Each crisis  featured
losses  of  bank  reserves,  sharp  rises  in  interest  rates  and bank  failures,  and
resort  to  the  pfiwate  manufacture  of  reserves  in  the  forn  of  clearing  house
certif  icates. 2s,  30,  31
The longest-lasting  impact  of  the  Aldrich  -Vreeland  Act  came fron  its
establishnent  of  a  j o  int  -  Congress  ional  Committee,  the  National  Monetary
Commission,  to  inquire  into  "necessary  or  desirable,'  changes  in  the  monetary
system.  The Cornrnission's proposal  (che  Aldrtch  plan)  for  a  federally
chartered  Reserve  Association  was submltted  in  1912.  The Federar  Reserve  Act
of  1913 was fundamentally  sinilar  to  the  Aldrich  plan,  although  the  cenrral
governing  body  of  Lhe new institution  was located  in  Washington  and consisted
exclusively  of  Presidential  appointees,  instead  of  being  in  New york  and
consisting  of  a  combination  of  representatives  of  uember banks  and
Pres  idential  appointees. 32
Bankers  generally  favored  rnonetary  reforrn  along  the  llnes  of  the  Aldrlch
plan  and Federal  Reserve  Bill,  but  vigorously  opposed some items  in  the  bill,
especially  the  transfer  of  reserves  to  Federal  Reserve  Banks.  "The Glass
bilL,  therefore,  seemed to  be hostile  not  only  to  the  interests  of  the  snall
banks  but  to  the  city  banks  with  whom  they  had kept  accounts;  the  former  lost
interest,  and the  latter  deposiLs."33
Among the  offsetting  concessions  for  banks  in  the  bill  that  finally
passed  were  reductions  in  reserve  requtrements  from  those  fornerly  imposed on
national  banks  and pernission  for  state  banks  to  remain  outslde  the  Federal
Reserve  System,  and  therefore  to  continue  to  avoid  the  (stfll)  higher  reserverequirements  of  national  banks.  As may be  seen  in  Table  1,  the  national-
bank/Fed-nernber  required  reserve  reductions  took  the  forrns  of  across  the  board
cuts  in  ratios  on demand deposits  and a much larger  cut  in  the  ratio  on tirne
deposits,  which  under  the  National  Bank Act  had  the  sane ratio  as  demand
deoosits.34
Beginni.ng  in  June  1917,  vault  cash  no  longer  counted  as  required
reserves.  The purpose  of  this  amendment  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  was to
encourage  the  deposlt  of  gold  wlth  Federal  Reserve  Banks in  the  event  of  a
gold  drain  should  the  United  States  enter  the  war.  But  the  effect  of  this
action  rras more than  offset  by  substantial  reductions  in  requlred  reserve
ratios  (See Table  1).35  Another,  sual1er,  effective  reduction  in  required
reserves  came in  a  Septenber  1918 amendment  that  allowed  banks  in  outlying
districts  of  centrar  reserve  or  reserve  cities  to  maLntain  the  feserve  ratios
of  reserve  city  or  country  banks.36  Norr that  interbank  deposlts  no  longer
satisfied  reserve  requireuents,  there  was no  advantage  in  central  reserve  city
or  reserve  city  status,  In  fact,  banks  in  those  cities  were  at  a  disadvantage
because  of  their  higher  reserve  fequirements.
By June  1917,  only  53 of  L8,725  srate  banks  had joined  the  Federal
Reserve  System,  and the  number of  national  banks  had  grown  only  1.8  percent
since  June  1913,  cornpared lrith  10.9  percent  for  state  banks.  The nr.unber  of
state  member  banks  rose  ten-fold  during  the  twelwe  months  following  the  1917
amendments, and by  June  1922 mlnbered  1,648,  or  7.8  percent  of  al_l  state
banks.  In  addltion  to  these  reductions  Ln its  costs.  Federal  Reserve
rnernbership  was made a patriotic  issue  much like  the  national  banking  systen
during  the  Civil  llar.  In  October 1917, president  Wilson wrore:  "It  is
raanifestly  imperatlve  that  there  should  be  a  coruplete  nobilization  of  the
13banking  resources  of  the  country.  "37  But  the  follorrlng  nonth  a  srnall-town
banker,  speaking  before  the  American  Bankers  Association,  said:  ,'I  do not
think  it  is  any more necessary  for  me to  join  the  Federal  Reserve  System to
show my patriotisn  than  it  is  for  me to  go down to  one of  these  hotels  and  Let
then  charge  me three  and a half  dollars  for  a plate  of  soup."38
The net  impact  of  the  origlnal  Federal  Reserve  Act  on  reserves  was quite
small  during  the  first  three  or  four  years  of  its  operatlon.3s  But  the  1917
amendments  were  followed  lrunediately  by  a  substantial  reduction  in  actual
reserve  ratios  (see  Table  1;  some of  this  reduction  was probably  due  to  rLsi.ng
interest  rates).  Howevet,  much more important  !n  the  long  run  was the
incencive  provided  by  the  Act  to  substitute  time  for  denand deposits.  Many
states  had no  reserve  requirements  in  1913,  and those  thst  did  often  had  lower
requirements  for  time  deposits;  so,  given  the  broadly  steady  interest  rates
between  1913 and  T929,  Lt  is  not  sutprising  that  tine  as  a proportion  of  total
deposits  in  state  banks was fairly  steady,  being  0.61  in  1913 and 0.59  in
L929  .  During  the  sarne  period  for  national  banks,  thls  proportion  rose  from
0.23  to  0.43.  Much of  this  increase  was no doubt due to  a genuine response to
the  rise  in  inEerest  rates  on time  relative  to  denand deposits  because  of  the
greater  profitability  of  the  forner.  But  much was due  to  bank  ewasions  of  the
higher  reserve  ratios  on  demand  deposits  by  sinply  reporting  then  as  t.ime
deposits.  Federal  Reserve  officials  repeatedly  viewed
with  grave  concern  the  \,reakening of  the  reserve  position  of  the  banks  of
the  country  due  to  the  constantly  growing  tendency  to  transfer  what  are
in  effect  dernand  deposits  into  so-called  time  certificates  or  savings
accounts. . .  .40
As nay  be  seen  in  Figure  2,  the  ratlo  of  time  to  total  deposits  (t)  was
not  particularly  sensitiwe  !o  interest  rates  before  1918, but  had a  stront
upward  trend  between  1918 and l93l  as banks  and  their  customers  adiusted  ro
I4the  new regulatory  environment.  Horrever,  it  fell  sharply  durlng  the  1930s and
then  rose  alnost  monotonically  (except  when lnterest  rates  fell)  after  the
abandorulent of  the  Fed,s  bond  support  program  in  the  early  1950s.
These effects  of  the  Federal  Reserve Act  (as  well  as  the  leglslation
discussed  earller)  suggest  that  the  reLatlonships  between  interest  rates  and
reserve  ratios  may be  quite  complex  dynanically.  The panic  and  sharp  rise  in
interest  rates  in  1907  (and  other  years)  induced  long-term  reductions  ln
reserve  requirements,  as well  as  changes  in  the  structure  of  those
requirements  which  made reserves  rnore sensltive  to  contemporaneous  changes  in
interest  rates -
Another  reason  for  the  fall  in  reserve  ratios  betr^reen  the  passage  of  the
Federal  Reserve  Act  and  the  Great  Depression,  whlch  further  complicates  the
dynamics,  was the  conpetitlwe  response  of  state  requirements  to  those  of  the
Federal  Reserve  systen.  Although  a  fe\,r states  introduced  or  raised  reserve
requl-rements  between  1914 and 1929,  uany  nore  rnoved in  the  opposite  dlrection.
Fifteen  states  lolrered  requirements  during  r9L4  and 1915,  and  tlrelve  states
Iowered  requirements  between  LgLl  and 1928.al  These actions  helped  to
maintain  the  relative  inportance  of  nonmernber  banks  throughout  Lhe 1920s  --
about  65 percent  of  banks  in  nurnber and  27 percent  in  deposits.  These
percentages  fell  sharply  during  rhe  1930s  --  to  60 and  L7 in  L933,  and  54 and
13  in  1941  --  largely  because  of  the  grearer  fail-ure  rate  of  the  smaller  srate
banks,  and lrere  still  54 and 16  in  1960,  but  had been  restored  to  their
earlier  values  by  the  end of  the  1970s --  62 and 2g in  197g,
We now move to  the  period  1935-51  in  wbich  reserve  requirements  were
used  as  an  instTument  of  monetary  policy.  As  early  as  1916 the  Federal
Reserve  Board  had  argued  for  discretion  to  raise  reserve  requLrernents  to
15enable  the  Board  "in  prolonged  perlods  of  extteDe  ease  Ln the  rnoney  r0arket  to
check  any  tendency  toward  ..,  undue extension  of  credit.traz  The Board's
request  was ignored  until  the  lhornas Amendment  to  the  Agricultural  Adjustment
Act  of  1933,  which  authorized  the  Board  to  make unlimited  changes  in  reserve
requirements  subJect  to  the  approval  of  the  President.  This  prowision  was
altered  in  the  Banking  Act  of  1935 such  that  the  Board was enabled,  without
the  approval  of  the  President,  to  raise  requLrenents  up  to  twice  their  1917
ratios,  A nerr Board rsas constituted  in  February  L936,  and between August  1936
and May 1937 doubled  required  reserve  ratios  in  order  to  ,'sterilize'  a portion
of  the  large  quantity  of  excess  reserves  held  by  banks.43  The Board's
vigorous  use  of  its  new powers  to  raise  reserve  requifements  above  the  1917
ratios  may be seen in  Table  1.
T'lxe  contributions  of  these  changes to  economic  stability  and war  finance
are  controversial  issues.  But  equally  interesLlng  is  thelr  polttical
possibility.  In  wiew  of  the  history  of  bankers'  pressures  for  required
reserve  reductions  following  periods  of  high  interest  rates,  which  as we have
seen \tere  often  accommodated  by  leglslators  and regulators,  it  is  not
surprising  that  central  bank  and Treasury  desires  for  high  requirements  were
realized  to  their  greatest  extent  during  the  1930s and 1940s,  the  period  of
lowest  interest  rates  and highest  federal  deficits  in  American  history.aa
But  this  was changed by  the  interest  rate  increases  of  the  1950s and
following  decades.  ft  ls  interesting  that  the  very  substantial  reductions  in
reserve  requirements  in  the  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980 closely  followed  the
bankers'  proposals  launched  in  the  1950s.  Bank spokesnen had  cornplained  that
through  high  reserve  requirements  banks were  being  forced  to  bear  the  brunt  of
whatever  anti  - inflationary  measures were  taken  to  offset  the  Federal  Reserve,s
16purchases  of  governrnent  securities.
ln  September 1948 that
Ihe  Natlonal  Clty  Bank  of  New York  argued
The stated  reason  for  auLhorizing  increases  in  the  reserve
requifements  at  this  time  was ',to  enable  the  Federal  Reserve  System to
aequire  more  --  if  necessary  many nore  --  long-tern  government
securities  to  maintain  the  long-tern  yield  lewel.,'  In  this  way,
Chairman McCabe  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  stated,  .new  reserves
created  by  such  System purchases  could  be  absorbed  through  increases  in
reserve  requirements  and thus  be  unavailable  for  roultiple  credit
expans  ion. "
By  this  "solution"  the  Federal  Reserve  presuxnably lrould  continue
to  inflate  their  goverrunent bond holdlngs  without  predeterrnined  lirnit,
and  in  so  doing  facllitate  increased  lending  by  nonbank  lenders.  The
reaction  of  the  practical  banker  --  if  one had been  called  upon  to
testify  --  nighL  well  have been:  ,'I{hy crack  down on us  so  that  our
conpetitors  can  take  the  business?"45
In  1953 the  New York  Clearing  House Association  argued  that
Any reserve  requirement  proposal  hrorthy  of  consideration  ought  to
be  loyal  to  the  American  conception  of  free,  competitlve  markets  and  to
recognize  inflationary  Govefnment outlays  as  the  primary  threat  to  the
value  of  noney...  Any legislation  on reserve  requirements  should
recognize  that  geographical  differentials  are,  ln  large  degree,
outrnoded; that  vault  cash  and a portion  of  balances  r^rith correspondents
might  properly  be  restored  as  legal  reserve  balances;  that  total  reserve
needs  are  excessive  under  the  existing  scale  of  feserve  requirenent
perceutages;  and that  the  powers  to  raise  reserve  requirenents  first
granted  in  1933 are  no  longer  needed.
The height  of  the  present  maximum  limits  on requirements  is  the
single  most  obj ectionable  feature  of  the  present  structure.  Under  an
easier  set  of  reserve  requirements  the  nation,s  cornmercial  banklng
system  can be  stronger,  healthler,  and more attractive  to  nen  and
eapital.  (pp.fI5-16)
And in  1957 the  Anerican  Bankers  Association  proposed  that  (1)  the
reserve  ratio  on denand deposits  be  reduced  to  10 percent,  (2)  thls  ratio  be
applled  uniforroly  to  all  menber banks,  eliroinatlng  geographical  differences,
(3)  the  Federal  Reserve,s  authority  to  vary  this  ratio  be  linited  to  a  range
of  8  to  12 percent,  (4)  the  reserve  requirenent  on  tlrne  deposits  be  reduced  to
2 percent,  and (5)  wault  cash be counted as legal  reserves,46
Congressional  oppositlon  to  reductions  in  reserve  requirements  lras
T]significant.  A Joint  Economic Cornmlttee staff  study  argued  that  if,  instead
of  lowering  reserve  requirements,  nonetary  growth  was faellitated  by  open
market  purchases,  i'the  Federal  Reserve  could  have  earned  interest  on  the
securities  purchased,  and  this  \,rould have benefited  the  Treasury  and  taxpayers
slnce  the  Reserve  System turns  ower  lts  net  earnlngs  to  the  Treasury.'A7  And
a written  qualification  to  a  1959 b!11  authorizing  the  inclusion  of  vault  cash
as  legal  reserves  indicated  that  ',it  is  not  the  intent  of  this  leglslation  to
encourage  or  cause  the  Federal  Open Market  CornmLttee to  feduce  the  Federal
Reserve  System's  holdings  of  Government securlties.',48
Nevertheless,  in  1958 the  Federal  Reserve  Board  proposed  to  Congress
that-the  Federal  Reserve  Act  be  amended (1)  to  authorize  the  Board  to  fix  the
reserve  ralio  for  dernand  deposits  of  central  reserve  city  banks  within  a  10 to
20 percent  range  in  place  of  the  13 to  26 percent  range  then  authorized  (the
range  for  reserve  city  banks  was already  L0-20),  (2)  to  nake  nore  flexible  the
Board's  authorlty  to  permit  banks  in  central  reserve  and reserve  cities  to
carry  Iower  reserves  than  those  specified  for  such  cities,  and  (3)  to
authorize  the  Board  to  allow  banks  to  count  vault  cash  as  fequifed  reserves.49
These proposals  were  duly  incorporated  in  law  in  1959,  along  with  a prowision
under  which  the  central  reserve  citv  classiflcation  was to  be  terminated  in
!962.50
But  Federal  Reserve  nernbership  continued  to  decline,  and  time  deposits
continued  to  rise,  which,  in  combination  with  the  reductlons  in  required.
reserve  ratios  achieved  between  1951 and  L962,  caused  actual  reserve  ratios  to
fa1l  about  fifty  percent  betr^'een 1951 and  1970  (see  Tabte  l).5r  In  the  latter
year  these  ratios  approxinated  their  1929 values.  There  was another  series  of
cuts  in  required  ratios  between  1973 and L976,  and then  in  1980 the
18acconplishment  of  the  ABA,s program was nearly  completed  by  the  Monetary
Control  Act.  In  addition  to  the  ternination  of  geographic  distinctions
betrteen  reserve  requirements  (fully  achieved  in  1966)  and the  eligibility  of
vault  cash  for  required  reserves  (1960),  in  the  1980s the  average  requlred
reserve  ratio  for  dernand  deposits  (counting  the  concession  to  small  banks)  had
been  loruered  to  slightly  less  than  12 percent  and  for  time  deposits  to  less
than  2 percent.
These reductions  \rere  part  of  a package which  included  the  extension  of
Federal  Reserve  control  ower  all  commercial  banks,  particularly  the
application  of  the  same reserve  requirements  to  nonmember  as  to  menber banks,
for  r,rhich the  Fed had been  lobbying  since  its  inception.52  The lower
requirements  and record-high  interest  rates  interacted  to  produce  cuts  in
actual  reserve  ratios  of  nearly  50 percent  between  1980 and 1984,  by  far  the
sharpest  fall  in  American  history.
Henry  Reuss,  Chairman  of  the  House Banking  Conmittee,  explalned  the
necessity  of  concessions  on reserve  requirements  in  the  Monetary  Contfol  Act,
especially  the  "elimination  of  requirements  on personal  time  and  sawi.ngs
deposits,"  to  an interviewer  as follows:
"We had  to  placate  the  small  banks  and  the  regionsl  banks  and  the
money-center  banks  --  all  of  then,"  Reuss explained.  The Federal
Reserve,  he  added,  was siuultaneously  trying  to  protect  its  own
interests  while  also  looking  out  for  the  banks.  "Axilrod  fthe  Fed staff
director]  r,rould throw  new formulas  into  the  hopper,"  Reuss said.
"Volcker,  under  Axllrod's  guidance,  r,zas  ahrays  trying  to  Bet  something
more for  the  banks -,,53
III.  A MODEL  OF BANK  RESERVE  RATIOS
The rnodel presented  below  formalizes  the  behavior  discussed  in  the
previous  sections.  consider  a  representative  bank wlth  the  following  balance
19sheet:
(r)  E  +A  +L  -  D  +K
t,tttt L:(1  -e  -a)D  +K
t  t  t'  t  t
or
where t  denotes the  date,  K is  equity,  D is  liabilities  (called  deposits),  L
is  loans,  A is  legal  required  reserves,  E ls  legal  excess reserves,  a:  A/D,
and e -  E/D.  Reserves  earn  no  interest.  L  and D are  short-tern  securities
paying  interest  rates  r  and q,  respectively,  and
(2) 
". 
:  a(r",  Xt,  Xr_1  , xi_2,...)  a. :  3ar/6xr_r1  0, 
"r" 
-  02a"/0x"_rlxr_u
lrhere  it  is  hypothesized  that  a,  is  an  inverse  functlon  of  r.  because,  for
example, of  the  shift  froro high  !o  low reserve  requirement  deposits  (i.e.,
denand to  tiroe  deposits  and Federal  Reserve  nember banks  to  non-mernber  banks)
when interest  rates  rLse.  The required  reserve  ratio  is  also  an  inverse
function  of  current  and past  expenditures,  *. 
"rd 
*r_r,  on  lobbying,  charter
changes,  and  other  non-market  efforts  to  reduce  reserve  requirements.  Since  x
is  neaningful  only  in  terms  of  resources  used,  ic  is  measured ln  real  terms,
as  are  the  other  dollar  variables  D,  cO,  K,  and zr.  Our  later  assutrption  that
future  D is  known with  certainty  gains  prausibility  r,rhen  D is  in  real  terms.
Bank profits  are
(3)  r.-r.L.  -qD  -c(eD)-x
r  t  L  't  t,  t  r'  !
where  the  cost  of  reserve  management is  an  inwerse  function  of  excess
reserves,  i.e,,  c'O  < 0,  because resefve  gains  or  losses  which  are  added to
or  deducted  fron  excess  reserve  do not  involve  the  transaetion  costs
associated  with  purchases  and sales  of  earning  assets.  substituting  (1)  into
(3)  gives
(4)  zrr-[r(l-e  -a)-qlD  -c(eD)-x  +rK -tlt..!,t't!,--L
If  r,q,  and D are  determined  by  conpetltlve  conditions  to  which  the  bank
must  conform,  and aII  profits  are  distributed  so  that  K*  -  K  is  a  constant,
20the bank's decision variables  are e  and x  (i  -  0,1,...).  It  wishes to
t+l  t+l
naximize
(5)  V:E  E  dlr
where  0(p(1  is  the.discount  factor  applied  to  f{.rture  profits  and  E  is  the
expectations  opefator,
Differentiating  (5)  with  respect  to  et+t  and  xsal  giwes  the  following
first-order  conditions,  where  for  simplicity  future  D  are  assumed  to  be  known
I^rith  celtainty:
dv




(7)  "--EBJaD  Er  -1:O
dx  i=o  i  t+i+J  t+i+j
t+i
where a  -da  /0x j  t+l+l'  t+i
We see  frorn  (6)  chat  at  the  optimum the  bank  holds  excess  reserves  up  to
the  point  at  which  the  marglnal  reduction  in  reserve  managenent costs  equals
the  expected  rate  of  return  foregone  by  holding  these  non-interest  bearing
asseLs.  We see  fron  (7)  that  the  bank purchases  lobbying  services  up  to  the
point  at  which  the  marginal  increase  in  expected  earnings  due  to  a  reduction
in  a  (note  that  ar <  0)  equals  the  cost  of  a unlt  of  those  services.  The
second-order  conditions  for  a maximum  are  satisfied  if  ar",  c,,>  0,  i.e.,  if
increases  in  lobbying  efforts,  x,  and excess  reserves,  e,  reduce  required
reserve  ratios  and  reserve  nanagement expenses at  decreaslng  rates.
The solution  of  (6)  and  (7)  is  a  stochastic  prograurning  probleur.  But  we
are  interested  only  in  the  responses  of  er  and xr  to  changes  in  r",  which  ma]r
2Lbe  obtained  by  totally  differentiating  the  system  with  respect  to  these  three
variables:
de1
(8)  t  :  - -  < o
dr  c"D
tt,
dx I,9"  ^
(9)  t'
D  f,




JJ  t+l  t+j
where  the  snms continue  to  be  ower J  fron  0  to  @, a..  -  62a._,16x.2,  and
r'  . :  aEr.../0r  -  1 if  J :0.  The sum in  the  numerator of  (9)  ls  positive  if
t+j  t+j'  t
r'..  >  0,  which  will  hold  under  either  extrapolatLve  or  regressive
t+j
expectations.
From (2)  and  (9),  the  response  of  the  current  required  reserve  ratio  to
current  and past  interest  rates  is
6a  dx
(f0)  d"*  :  t 




The coefficients  of  the dr"_, (i:0,L,...)  are negative because  |ar/7rr,
a.  (  0 and 0x. ./0r  > 0,  Therefore,  from  (8)  and (10),  the  sum  of  excess
i  t-1'  t-l
and required  reserve  ratios  is  a  negative  function  of  current  and past
interest  rates,
This  inplication  of  our  roodel is  broadly  supported  by  the  estinates  for
I882-L987  in  the  left-hand  poftion  of  Table  2.  cNp has  been  added to  lnterest
tates  because  of  its  potential  usefulness  as  an  indication  of  the  strength  of
Ioan  dernand  and of  the  expected  profitability  of  loans  for  giwen  loan  rates.
Estinates  for  the  period  since  the  creation  of  the  Federal  Reserve
(f914-87)  are  roughly  simllar  to  those  for  the  longer  period,  although  the
22
dr3greater  is  the  weight  placed  on  the  more recent  period--since  the  mid-
1930s,  when the  Federal  Reserve began  to  use  required  reserve  ratios
intermitlently  as  part  of  countercyclical  policy--the  less  negative  are  the
short-tern  lnterest  rate  impacts  on  the  reserve  ratio,  and  the  longer  lasting
are  the  incerest-  rate  impacts.  Notice  that  the  coefflclent  of  R0 is
significant  and positive  fot  L933-79.  This  lends  some support  to  the  short-
teru  impact  of  the  public,  or  social  determinants  of  reserve  requirements
discussed  in  Section  I,  accordlng  to  which  officlals  adjust  those  requirenents
in  direct  relation  to  interest  rates.  But  the  opposlte  hypothesis,  according
to  which  banks  succeed  in  getting  reserve  ratios  reduced  in  response  to  rising
interest  rates,  receives  greater  empirical  support.  The lengths  of  the  lags
reported  in  Tables  2  and 3  are  determined  by  naxlmum adlusted  coefftcients  of
deterrnlnation  (-R2).  It  appears  that  the  period  ower whlch  Lnterest  rates
affect  reserve  ratios  has  grown over  time,  and that  the  explanatory  power  of
interest  rates  and GNP  has  also  gtom.
The perlod  1933-19  ls  reported  in  Table  2  for  cornparison  with  Table  3,
which  reports  regressLons  for  Federal  Reserve member  bank  total,  excess  and
required  reserve  ratios  for  the  same period.  Excess  and required  reserves  are
available  separately  only  for  this  class  of  banks  and,  on  a  contl.nuous  basis
only  since  L932.  This  sarnple ends  in  1979 because  of  the  large  and sudden
addition  of  a1I  other  depository  institutions  to  the  data  base.  Interesting
features  of  these  estimates  are:  the  large,  irnmedLate, negative  impact  of
interest  rates  on e  and  the  longer,  smaller  irnpact  on a,  whlch  are  consislent
with  the  model  presented  abowe;  and also  the  greater  explanatory  power  of  the
regression  model when the  total  reserve  ratlo  (a+e)  is  used  rather  than  when a
and  e  are  used  as  dependent  variables  separately.  These results  suggest  that
23the  total  reserve  decision,  considering  both  short-term  and long-term
influences,  is  the  correct  subject  of  analysts,  and  that  it  nay  not  be
appropriate  to  study  excess  and requlred  reserves  separately.
IV.  CONCLUS]ON  .,AND,  ]MPL,ICATIONS  FOR  ,.MONETARY  THEORY
The results  presented  above,  both  the  lnfornal  evidence  in  Section  II
and  the  regression  estimates  in  Section  III,  suggest  that  there  is  no  clear
theoretical  or  empirical  distinction  between  different  categorles  of
cornmercial  bank  liabilities.  Tirne deposits  have  often  been used. for
transaction  purposes,  and checking  accounts  hawe often  been reported  as  tlme
deposits,  The broad  money supply  approach  of  Friedxnan and  Schwarrz  (1953)
appears  to  be  appropriate,  both  on  cheoretical  grounds  and  in  terns  of  the
xnanner in  which  the  data  hawe been  reported.
Similarly,  there  is  no  clear  distinction  bet\,reen requi.red  and excess
reserves,  In  fact,  both  names are  misleadlng.  No reserves  are  "required!!,
and  therefore  none are  ,'excess".  AII  reserwes  respond  to  events;  they  are  all
decision  wariables  (i.e.  e)  or  the  dlrect  outcones of  deci.slon variables  (i.e.
x).
The endogenelty  of  all  reserve  ratlos  lends  support  to  the  posltion  that
money has  been,  and  in  fact  must be,  endogenous.  It  is  no  good saying  .that
money must  be  rnade  exogenous if  by  the  very  nature  of  our  political  system
reserve  requirenents,  for  example,  are  the  outcomes of  the  interplay  of
conflicting  and cooperative  forces  that  in  turn  are  responses  to  economlc
events.  There  is  hardly  any question  that  Doney in  the  United  States  has been
endogenous:  the  monetary  base has  responded  strongly  to  governnent  fiscal
requirenents  during  two world  wars  and the  1970s,  to  the  Fed,s  desire  for
24stable  interest  rates  during  1929-1933 and other  periods,  and of  course  there
can be no  questLon  of  exogeneity  under  a  gold  standard;  the  currency  /deposit
ratio  has  responded  to  tax  and  interest  rates;  the  total  bank  reserve/deposit
ratio  has  responded  to  lnterest  rates  because  of  differential  reserve
requj.rements;  and  FinalJ.y  we  see  that  every  lern  in  the  traditional  money
nultiplier  analysis  is  endogenous when !t  is  discovered  that  even  the  so-
called  required  reserve  ratios  afe  functions  of  expected  rates  of  return  on
earning  assets.54
Finally,  our  results  contradict  Jaroes Tobln's  (1963)  clain  that  the
differences  belween  banks  and other  financial  firms  are  due to  dlfferences  in
regulation,  especially  reserve  requirements.  If  these  regulations  are  not
imposed exogenously,  but  are  largely  deternined  by  the  banks  thenselves,
Tobin's  argument  falls  to  the  ground.  Our  results  suggest  that  banks  are  more
different  from  other  intermediarles  than  is  apparent  from  a  comparLson of
balance  sheets,  for  instead  of  hawing  large  amounts of  non- transaction
liabilities,  like  other  intermediaries,  banks  are  effectively  in  the  business
of  supplying  transaction  accounts.  After  all,  iL  is  not  regulation  which
giwes  rise  to  most  inter-firm  differences,  Shoe stores  and  tree  trimrners  do
different  Lhings.  Banks and S&Ls arose  in  response  to  different  needs;
regulations  have  been  established  to  protect  their  turf  and to  lock  then  lnto
their  original  forms;  but  if  changes  in  economic conditions  alter  the
incentives  of  firrns,  can  regulatlons  prevent  the  actj.ons  following  fron  those
incentives?  0r  can  they  force  behavior  inconsistent  with  incentives?  We
think  that  events  of  the  last  30 years  inply  negative  responses.  Perhaps
regulations  are  determined  by,  and have  relatively  little  effect  on,  the  firns
whlch  are  supposedly  regulated.
25lable  I
Required  Reserve  Ratios  of National  Banks  (fron 1887),  Federal
Reserve  l,4ember  Banks  (from  1913),  and  All  Depository
Institutions  (from  1990),  Actual  Reserve  Ratios,
and  the Connercial  Paper  Rate
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Nat'i  onal Bank  Act
as amended  1887
Mi  n. cash  i  n vaul  t



























Fed.  Res.  Act (  1913)
Mi  n. cash  i  n vaul  t

























Aug-  1936-May  1937
Apri  I  1938
Nov.  1941
Auq.  -oct. 1942
Feb.  -Sep,  1948
l.lay-Sep.  1949
Jan.  -Feb,  1951
July  1953-Aug.  1954
Feb.  -Apr,  1958
16.5  8.5  0.75
19.4  16.8  1.00
22.8  14.6  0.88
23.9  18.1  0.67
16.9  16.0  0.69
16.3  16.4  1.56
14.3  14.0  1.31
16.0  15.9  2.31



































Dec.  1959-  ov. 1960 All  vault  cash phased  in  as reserves L7 3.83
Sep.  -Dec. 1960







5 10.5 ll.l  2.9r
9.2  10.0 3.38
Revi  sed  schedule
Jul  y 19  66, _lGt  lenand deposi  ts'  Tine and savi  nqs deposi  ts
Regerve  city  Countrv  Savinqs
0-$5  over $5  0-$5  over $5
|  1me-
0-$5 over  $5










































26Revi  sed  schedule
Novenber  I972
l.let demand  deposi  tsc
$2- $10-  $100- over
0-$z  $10 $100  S400 9400  Savi  nss
Time  and savinqs deDosi  ts
rllrlet-
30-179 180  days-  4+
days  4 years  yrs.
I:J
-',',.






I  10.s 12.5  13.5  17.5
7.5  10  12  13  16.5  3
1976  1.5  10  12  13  16.s  3
7  9.5 11.75  12.75  16.25  3
3:3  1974  6.7  i.8  11.0i
3:3  1975  6.2  6.9  5.73
3:6  2.512.5  1:l  1976  5.7  6.6  5.89
3:6  2.512.5  1:1  1977  5.3  6.3  5.46
tlansaction  accounts',d
0-$41-  5  over  $41  .5
Revi  sed  schedul  e
(for all  deposi  tory
j  nsti  tuti  ons  )
Phasedi  n 1980-87
Time  and savinqs deposits
Personal
NonDersonal
0-1.5  1.5  yea  rs
years  or r0re
3.2  3.6 11.11
3.6  4.2  6.67
0efinitions of selected  terms  and  chronoloay  of maior  additions  to the above  ratios:
..  ..  et qemjtnd  deDosits: denand  deposits  less those  due  from  other banks  and  less cash  items  in the process  of
collecrl,on.  , u 5. government  deposits  were  not subject  to reserve  requi  rements  between  1902  and  1935, 0emand  deposits
ggi!+!!i  deinand  deposits  except  jnterbank  and  U.s. government  depoiits less cash  itsns in the process-6i-6iTEiTTiil  lsee BMS.  1914-41,  pp. 65-67,  for nore  detail.)
cent.Ial  reser.ve  c.itY  ban!s,: lvhich  Bere  "approved  agents"  for portions  of the reserves  of reserve  city  and  countrv
banks,  were  those  in New  York  and  chicago  fron 1887  to 1962  and  in St, Louis  fron 1887  to tgaZ.  nesEive-c  i  ty-EanlilE approved  agents  for po.tions of the resirves of country  banks;  there sere 16 reserve  cities  in 1887,  49 in 1414,  and  46 jn
1970.
..  Transactiol  apcoultsi  all..deposits  subject  to withdranal  or transfer to third parties in excess  of three tines per
ftcnth,.except,  beqinning  in 1982,  "money  narket  accounts,"  lrhich  are allowed  nore than  ihree rEnthly transfers, have  been
suDJecr  ro !rme  depostt  reserve  requirements.
Add.i.tigna]  repuil:emenls:  ouring  1969-78  there were  reserve  requirements  on net balances  owed  by donestic  bank
o1llces-to their  foreign branches  and,  at various  times  beiween  1973  and  1980,  on increases  in targe ti;e  depos'its,  borrowing by affiliates,  sales  of finance  bi11s, Eurodollar  borrowings,  repurchase  agreements,  and  federal finds borrowed  from
nonnernbers.  Eurocurrency  liabilities  erere  [Ede  subject  to a 3 percent  res;rve rati;  by the Monetary  Control  Act of 1980, (See  ASD.  1970-79,  p. 571  and  EBE!.  Feb.  19S7,  p. Ai for detait;.)
-  Sv.mbolsl  A is the total  reserves  of all  cormercial  banks,  including  vault cash  and  deposjts  nlth the Federal Reserve..  11887-1947,  [!!,  1963;  1948-87,  BMS.  1941-70,  ASDs,  FRB;S)  0. is diemand  deposits  and'other  checkable  dlposits
:qjr:!gq  P]9! tjne deposits  and  other short+erm  liabiiiiTEl  ii-conmeriiat banks  (10b7-1947,  F&s.  1963;  1948-50  Bi.1s.  1941-
l!;  1959-1985,  Fed.  Eoard  Release;  1986-87,  FRBns)  A. is required  reserves  in cornercia'l  oants  sutjeci to FederiTTElEiiE
regulations  (all depository  institutions  after l98o),'rlhich  have  been  reported  only  since  1949.  (Bila-  1914-41.  1941-70,  AsDs,
lR8-ns)-  9n is net denand  deposits  and  time deposits  in banks  (and  other itepository-instiiuiions;iter-iEEdFub-Fct  to 
-'
Federal  Reserve  regulations,  (E!9, l9l4-41. r94l-70; ASD  l97d_79.  1980;  not repoited  after  l9g0  but estimited  here  by
assuming  growth  rate of Dh  equal  to that of D.) R is the 4-6 month  connercial  paper  rate until  1971  and  the average  oi 3 and
o-montn  coflmercial  paper  rates thereaftef, (1887,  Standard  Statistical  Bulletin, L!i.3.!:33;  1913-87,  Bl4S.  1914-41.  1941-70, ASos,  FRBns)
Footnotes:
a -  Two  dates  indicate a series of changes.
b -  The  Central  Reserve  Cjty classificatjon tas ended  July 1962.
c -  Reserve  requirements  are graduated  such  that each  deposit  is subject  to the indicated  ratio.
d -  The  llonetary  control Act of 1980  requires  that the anount  of transaction  accounts  subject  to the 3 percent
requi  rement  be raised  annually  by 80 percent  of the percentage  increase  in transaction  accounts  in all  depository jnstitutions,  whjch  has  neant  an  jncrease  from  gZ.5  ioiltion  in Dec.  t980  to g41.5  nillion in Dec.  l9gg. The  Garn_
5t.  Germain  Act of 1982-provided  for a further $2  million exemption  from  all  reserve  requi  rements,  to be  adjusted
(upward  only)  in a similar  manner.  (See  !8g!., Feb.  198i,  p. i7)
1984
1986Table  2
Deteruinants  of  the  Comtrercial  Bank Total  Reserve  Ratio
Annual  Data
Dependent Variable  Alog(a+e)

































































































































.L92  -  .48
.190  -L.64
.166  -3.30
The i::dependent  variables  are  changes  in  the  corunercial  paper  rate  R  (source  as
indicated  in  Table  1),  and  first  difference  of  the  logarithinic  walue  of  annual  real  cNP
(Y,  fron  Balke  and Gordon,  1985,  updated  using  the  Survev  of  Current  Business).  Ri  and Yi
indicate  a  lag  of  i  years.  The dependent  variable  is  for  June  of  each year,  and
corresponds  with  the  first  difference  of  the  logarithnic  value  of  A/Da in  Table  l.
28Table  3
Determlnants  of  Federal  Reserve  Menber Bank Total  (a+e),
Excess (e),  and Required  (a)  Reserve Ratlos
Annual  Data,  L933-L979
Dependent  Variables  Alog(a+e),  Alog  e,  Alog  a
a+e



























































































































Variables  are  defined  as  in  Table  2,
and e  is  excess  teserves  in  Federal  Reserve
o  .39
2.I5
except  here  a  corresponds
member  banks  as  a  ratio
0.24
2  .37




*We are  grateful  to  Robert  Barsky  for  helpful  discussions  and  to  John
Sciortino  and  Stephen  Prue  for  research  assistance.
1 -GoldfeId  (1-966,  p.  38).
t -For  example, Goldfeld  (1956, pp.  39-41)  and Morrison  (1966).
? -There 
has  been no  investigation  of  which  roe are  aware  of  a possibly
stable  long-run  connection  between  required  reserves  and  interest  rates,
although  writers  have  noted  the  reductions  in  Federal  Reserve  required  reserve
ratios  when banks  traded  System requlfenents  for  more lenient  state
requirements  as  interest  rates  rose  following  World  l{ar  II,  shifts  from  low  to
high  reserve  requirement  deposits  durlng  periods  of  rising  intefest  rates,  and
other  occurrences  that,  if  put  together,  would  provide  a basis  for  an
hypothesized  inverse  felation  between  feserve  requirenents  and  interest  rates.
See the  references  in  Sectlon  IL
tt
For exanple Goldfeld  (1966, pp.  178-82) and Snith  (f963).  For  an
example of  exogenous reserve  requirenents  in  a macroeconometric  model  see
Hyrnans,  er.  al  (1989) or  Fair  (1994).
5 -Although 
sometimes forgotten  in  modern discussl-ons,  this  point  has  long
been  recognlzed:  "Of  what  use  is  it  that  a bank has  the  gold  and silver  if
the  law  forblds  !t  to  part  ruith  it?"  fKettell,  1848, quoted in  Miller,  1927,
p.  ls3l  .
-This 
wiew  is  widely  held,  even by  Friednan  [1960],  although  !r  ls  by  no
means uniwersal.  See Klein  [1974]  and Hayek  [1978]  for  arguments  that  free
(unregulated)  banking  is  consistent  with  the  special  uonetary  role  of  banks,
and White  [1984,  pp.  L37-50]  for  a survey  of  this  controversy.
7 'See 
Hirshleifer,s  "Conmenr" IL975]  on pelrznan  tI976l .
a -Posner 
[1974]  suggests  that  the  demand for  regulation  is  greatest  in
unconcentrated  industries,  for  whlch  cartelization  is  an unfeasible  or  costly
alternative.  As American  banking  illustrates,  these  are  also  the  industries
in  which  effecLive  regulatory  enforcement  is  most  dtfftcult.  See Osborne
[1976]  for  an argument  that  carlels  are  not  inherently  unstable  but  that  their
continuance  requires  the  solution  of  several  problens.  one  of  the  most
serious  problems,  limitatlons  on output,  was not  even  addressed  by  the  banking
carteL  or  its  patron/regulators  .
o -This 
is  an example of  Becker's  [1983] proposition  that  an increase  in
the  deadweight  cost  of  taxes  reduces  the  equilibrir.m  subsidy.
10 --For 
examples of  banker  and depositor  opposltlon  to  l-nterest  cellings
see HearinEs  before  the  Subcornmittee on Domestic  Finance  of  the  Conunlttee on
Banking  and  Currencv  (on  H.R.  9687:  "A Bill  to  Amend the  Federal  Reserve  Act
and  the  Federal  Deposit  lnsurance  Act  by  Eliminating  the  prohibition  Agalnst
the  Payment of  Interest  on Demand  Depositsr'),  House of  Representatives  ,
30February  to  April  1954.  Two widely  publiclzed  studies  (the  Hunt  and FINE
reports  of  1971 and 1973)  recornmended  the  elirnination  of  most  or  all  lntefesc
ceilings,  and bills  incorporating  many of  these  reconmendatlons  passed  the
SenaLe in  1975 and  L977 brtt  failed  in  the  House.  For  historles  of  the
pressures  leadlng  to  the  end of  most  interest  ceilings  see Cargill  and carcia
[1982,  pp.  2-5,  T2-L251 and lJood  and l.Iood  [1985, pp.  28-42,  58-651  .
,-United 
States  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  District  of  Colurbia  Circuit,
September  terns,  1978, nos.  78-1337, ?8-1849, 7g-2206.  See  the discussion in
Wood  and l,Iood  11985,  pp.  61-621.
1') --On 
the  other  hand,  Peltzman  [1965]  found  that  when federal  control
over  entry  into  conrnercial  banking  (by  the  Federal  Reserve  and  the  FDIC under
"convenlence  and needs  of  the  coumunity"  and  ',earnings  prospects.  criteris)
was extended  in  the  foru  of  a veto  power  over  the  granting  of  charters  by
states,  under  the  Banking  Act  of  1935,  the  entry  rate  lnto  banklng  ',was
signif  icantly  reduced.',
--Section 
31 of  the  National  Bank Act  as  revised  in  1864.  See Krooss
I11  , p.  1396  ]  .
-  See Cagan [1963,  p.  32n]  and Kamlnow 1L977)  for  algebraic
denonstrations  of  this  polnt  under  varlous  conditions.
rrHart 
[1935] and Frledman [1950, pp.  65-7G]
l6se. 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board Annual Reoort  for  1916, p.  28,  and the
Federal  Reserve Bullecin,  January 1917, p,  l.
17 -'See 
Laidler  [1985, pp.  L2L-L34).
1R --See 
Moore [1980, pp.  349-tt).
1q --Frox0 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board's  statement  of  lts  !ggpgggs__!4f1
.  Functions,  1984, p.  1
')  (\ --See 
Hamrnond  [1963],  Karunarilake  [1953],  Miller  [1927],  and Rodkey
[1934]  for  histories  of  reserve  requirements.  In  the  ewent,  the  laws  usually
allowed  requi.red  reserves  to  serve  as  true  reserves  tenporarlly.  For  example
the  Louisiana  Free  Banking  Act  of  1853 prowided  that  if  a bank,s  reserves
"should  fall  below the  lprescribed]  proportlons  to  cash liabilities,  ...  ,  and
shall  renain  so for  the  space of  ten  days,  it  shall  not  be lawful...to  make
any loan  or  discount  whatever until  its...position  !s  feestablished.  . . .  "
[Sec.  27;  see Krooss,  1969,  It,  p.  1215] a;d  rhe National  Bank Acr  prowided
that  when the  reserve  fel1  below  that  required.  a bank  shourd  nnot  increase  its
liabilities  by  rnaking any neu  loans  or  discounts  otherwlse  than  by  dlscounting
or  purchasing  bllls  of  exchange payable  at  sight,  nor  nake  any dividend  of  its
profits  until  the  required  reserve  ratio  was reestablished.  ISec.  3l;  see
Krooss, L969, II , p.  f3961.
21Th" 
lrot""  in  the  heavily  Republican  Senate  and House were  23-2I  and
The bill  was hastlly  drawn and had  to  be  alnost
31
78-64,respectlvely.conpletely  rer{rritten
discussion  of  support
tc
bee r rredrnan
Rodkey [1934, p.  32],
reserve  requirements,
a year  later.  See Robertson  [].963, pp.  33-451 for  a
for  and opposition  (especlally  by  bankers)  to  the  btll.
and Schwartz [1963, p.  56],  Roberrson [1963, pp.  54-65],
and Whlte  [f983,  pp.  29-321  fot  accounts  of  state  bank
Annual  Report.  1894, p.  1xxx,  and Friedman
23Rob"rt"or, 
[1-963,  p. 53],
24H.i.. 
[19s3,  pp. 12-13].
,)\ --This 
amendrnent to  the  National  Bank  AcL  prowlded  chat  on  the
application  of  three-fourths  of  the  national  banks  in  cities  with  populatlons
of  a  least  50,000  and 200,000  the  conptroller  could  name them reserve  and
central  reserve  cities,  respectlvely.  Chicago,  New York,  and  St.  Louis
irunediately  elected  to  become central  reserve  clties,  and between  1887 and
1913 the  number of  reserve  cities  increased  fron  15 to  49.
-"According 
to  the  new regulatory  terminology,  the  appropriate  term  here
is  "checkable  deposits,"  which  includes  ,'demand  deposl-ts, "  "NOW  accounts,"  and
other  accounts  distinguished  for  the  purposes  of  regulation.  For  simplicity
and  consistency  over  lhe  period  of  our  study,  we use  "demand deposits,"  in  its
original  sense,  for  all  bank deposits  payable  on demand, i,e.,  for  all
checking  accounts.
a1 -'Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,
and Schwartz [1963, pp.  117-18].
19. -"Sprague's 
[1910]  chapter  ritles  are  "The crlsls  of  1873,"  "The panic
of  May, 1-884,  "  "Flnancial  stringency  in  l-890,,, ,'The crisis  of  t-893,'  and The
crisis  of  1907."  See Noyes [1909, pp.  284-3071 for  a diseusslon  of  the  "r!ch
nan's panic"  of  1901.
to --In 
nonthly  average  percentages  the  conmercial  paper  rate  (defined  in
Table  1)  rose  from  6,50  in  June 1873 to  17.00  in  October.  There was a smaller
rise  in  1884 from 4.62  in  March to  5.95  in  Ju1y,  after  averaging  about  5.30
between  1875 and  1883.  It  averaged  8.00  between March  and Septenber  1893
after  being  below  5.00 during  most of  1892, and rose  fron  5.40  and 8.00
between May and December 1907 after  averaging  about  4.70  between  l-900 and
1906  _
30 --The 
nurober of  failures  rose  from  29  in  L87I-72  to  98 in  L873-74,  from
55 in  1882-83 to  109 in  1884-85,  fron  145 in  1891-92 ro  585 in  1893-94,  and
frorn 133 in  1905-1906 to  246 in  1907-1908.  Mosr faLlures  were of  rhe  smaller
state  banks,  but  the  proportional  increases  were  similar  for  national  banks.
11 --See 
Myers [1931, pp. 418-201.
22
"-See Dewey [f915,  pp.  482-83,  49L-931 for  a concLse comparison of  the
Aldrich  plan  and the  Federal  Reserve Act.  Also  see Krooss  [1969,  III  ,  pp.
2O9O-24161,  Laughlin  [1933], Kolko [1953, pp.  242-411, and  Warburg [1930, I,
pp.  I78  -423I  .
32aa
""taughlin  t1933, p.  1a71.  Carter  class  of  Virginia,  Chairrnan  of  the
House Banking  and Currency  Corunlttee,  was the  foremost  prornoter  of  the  bill
that  eventually  became the  Federal  Reserve  Act.
34^  -. Atter  passage  of  the  bilL  through  the  House,  banker  opposition
expressed  during  lengthy  Senate hearings  produced  further  reductions  in
reserve  requlfements  (nost  importantly  a  cut  ln  the  demand deposit  ratio  for
reserve  city  banks frorn 18 to  15 percent),  which,  contrary  to  class's  claim  in
the  House,  were  largely  kept  by  the  House-senate  conference  and  in  the  final
Act.  Glass's  speech of  Decenber 22,  f9I3,  is  reproduced ln  hls  account of
these  disputes  1L927, pp.  3I7-261,  A cornparison of  reserve  requirements  in
Lhe different  versions  is  presented  in  Federal  Reserve Board [1938, p.  957].
The differences  between  the  Aldrich,  Glass,  and other  proposals  hardly
seem sufficient  to  justify  the  virulence  of  the  debate,  chronicled  in  Link
f1-956,  pp.  I99-2401,  Laughlln  [1933],  Glass  l1927l,  and elsewhere.  The
conflict  was strongly  partisan.  The Republicans  had  lost  Congress  and  the
presidency  between  the  appointment  of  the  National  Monetary  Conmission  and  its
report.  William  Howard Taft  later  wrote  thar  in  delaying  rhe  bill  rhe
Republican  senators  were  not  attenpting  to  prevent  monetary  reform  but  rather
to  prove  rrthat  everything  that  is  good in  the  Currency  Legislation  carne from
the  Aldrich  B1II,  and that  which  is  wrons  j.s  due to  a nixture  of  Brvanisn..
ILink,  1956, p.  235]  .  Kolko has argued fersuaslvely  thar,  far  frorn-  opposing
the  Federal  Reserve  Act,  bankers  had  initiated  and  sustained  the  movement for
the  reforms  which  it  contained  in  an attenpt  to  "offset,  through  political
means,  the  diffusion  and decentral  izat  ion  within  banklng,,,  Apparent
oPpositlon  was merely  "coyness in  the  hope of  gaining  concessions. "  [1963,
PP. 25O, 2341  .
"The  conditions  of  Federal  Reserve mernbership were  also  relaxed  in
other ways; See  White [1983, p.  135].
1K --For 
a  list  of  banks  that  took  advantase  of  this  amendment  see  Federal
Rese.rve  Board,  Banking and Monetar.v  sratistic;.  1914-41, p.63.
''See 
Harding [1925, pp,  83-84] for  rhe conplete text  of Wilson,s
Ietcer,  which  was requested  and distributed  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board.
38Tipp.r" 
[1929, p.  118] and white  [1983, pp.  136-37].
'lq --See  A/D"  for  19L3-18  ln Tabte  1"  and  Cagan  [19G5,  pp. lgS-91].
40-
lron  an agenda prepared  by  George L.  Harrison,  Governor  of  the  Fedefal
Reserve  Bank of  Ner,r  York,  fox  a  1927 Conference  of  Governors  of  Federal
Reserwe Banks.  (quoted  by  Friedrnan and Schwartz  11963, p,  277n1)  (Gowernors
of  Federal  Reserve  Banks have  been called  presidents  since  the  Banklng  Act  of
1935.)  See the  sanne  reference  for  other  complalnts  by  Harrison  Gn  f924,
1927,  and 1928),  and the  Federal  Reserve Board Annual Report  for  1932, pp.
27L-74,  for  a d.iscussion of  the  evasions  occasilned  by  the  lower  reserve
requirements  of  time  deposits.
l341s". whit. [1983,  pp. I42-491
42_
!eoeral  Reserve
1L962,  p.  L49).
43F"d"t"1 
Reserve  Board
Karunatilake  [1963, pp.  66-88]
44I., 
r."1  terus  and as  a percentage  of  GNp.
--Monthly 
Letter,  p.  101.  Quored !n  Ahearn  [1963, pp.  159-50].
ILA '-This  proposal  received  a  gxeaX deal  of  attention.  For  example,  see
Ahearn  [1963,  pp.  158-59],  Golenan [1960, pp.  87-881,  and Norton  and Jacoby
[959,  pp.  109-110].  Alvin  Hansen [L958]  conmenred:  ,'The  bankers are,  in
effect,  asking  Congress  to  hand  them on a  silver  platter  $9.8  billions  of
earning  assets  in  place  of  an equivalent  amount of  unearning  cash  assets  \rhich
they  are  now tequired  to  hoLd as  reserves."  The ABA "deplores  the  fact  that
the  Federal  Reserve  Banks had  absorbed  so high  a proportion  of  the  war  Lssues.
The conmercial  banks  could  hawe done the  iob  with  less  use  of  Federal  Reserve
credit  had  the  reserve  requiren0ent  been  rlduced.  Had this  been  done,  nearly
aII  of  the  asset  windfalls  would  hawe fallen  to  the  coxnnercial  banks  and
virtually  none  to  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks. "
t7 ''This 
is  from Ahearn,  s  [1963,  pp.  158-591 sunuary of  the  Conmlrtee's
1959 Emplovment  Hearinss,  pr.  6A, pp.  1-254-55.
AR '-Senate-House 
Conference  Report,  Member Bank Reserve  Reouirements,
Ilouse Report  No.  651,  86th  Congress, lst  Sesslon,  1959, p.  5.  See Ahearn
[1953  , p.  159].
LO --Federal 
Reserve Board 11958, 19591.  The second article  was an
elaboration  of  the  first  for  presentation  to  the  House and Senate  Banking  and
Currency  Comnittees.  These proposals  are  discussed  in  Norton  and Jacoby
[19s9, p.  lls].
--The 
act  of  JuIy  1959 is  given  on pages 888-89 of  rhe Augus  r  1959
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.  The Board,s  early  use  of  its  new authority  to  allow
vault  cash  to  be  counted  as  requlred  reserves  was reported  on pages  L482-83  of
the  December 1959 Federal  Reserve  Bul1etln,
ql
for  sf,uoLes ot  the  costs
[1978],  cilberx  1L9771,  and l{hire
\) --Examples 
of  Federal  Reserve  lobbying  for  forced  nerbership  in  the
Systen  (in  addition  to  pleas  for  voluntary  accessing  such  as  the  letter
drafted  for  President  I,IiIson  quoted  above  )  nay  be  found  in  statements  by
Governor  Strong  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  New york  in  1916  [Chandler,
1959, pp.  80-821,  Chairnan of  the  Federal  Reserve Board Thornas  McCabe  in  1949,
IEastburn,  1965, pp.  193-96],  and Chalrnan Arthur  Burns in  1973 [Starleaf,
L9751  .
Board  Annual Report  for  1915,
Annual  Reoort  for  1936,
p.  28.  Also  see Ahearn
p.  14.  AIso see
of  Fed  membership  see  Garnbs and  Rasche
[1983, pp.  42-62, L67  -871  .
34""Greider  [1987, p,  151].  Greider  also  presents  an interesting  account
of  hor.r  bankers  and  the  Fed mobillzed  pressure  on congressmen by  comraunlty
leaders  back  houe .
"-Contrary  to  Mlshkin.s  stateuent  (19S9 p.  552)  that  "the  increase  Ln
reserve  requirement,s  in  1936-1937  .  .  can probably  be  classified  as  an
exogenous event  rrith  the  characterlstlcs  of  a  controlled  exDeriment.  "
35References
Daniel  S. Ahearn,  Federal  Reserve pollcv  Reaporaised.  195L-1959, Colunbia
Univ.  Press,  New  York,  1963.
American  Bankers  AssociatLon  Econornic  policy  comnlttee,  @E-.bk-BqEs-Ea9
Requirenents,  New  York,  1957.
Nathan  S.-Ba.lke  and Robert  J.  Gordon,  "Appenallx B:  Hlstorlcal  Data,"  in
Gordon,  ed.,  The American  Business  Cycle,  Uniwersity  of  Ghicago
Press,  Chicago,  1986.
Clay  J.  Anderson,  A Half-Centurv  of  Federal  Reserve  pollcyrnaktng.  1914-19G4,
Federal  Reserve  Bank of  philadelphia,  1965.
Gary  S.  Becker,  "A Theory  of  Conpetitlon  :tmong  pressure  Groups  for  political
Tnfluence, "  98 Ouar. J.  of  Econ.,  August L993, 371-400.
Phlllip  Cagan,  Determinants  and Effects  of  Changes in  the  Stock  of  Money  -
1875-1960, Colurnbia  Unlversity  press,  New  york,  1965.
,  "The  First  Fifty  Years  of  rhe  Natlonal  Banking  Systen  --  An
Historical  Appraisal,  "  in  Deane Carson,  ed.,  Banking  and Monetar.rr
Studies,  Richard  D.  Irwin,  Homewood,  Il.,  1963.
Thomas F.  Cargill  and Gillian  Garcia,  Financial  Deregulation  aud Monetary
Control:  Historical  Perspeetive  and  Inpact  of  the  1980 Act,  Hoover
Institution,  Stanford,  1992.
Lester  V.  Chandler,  Benlamin  Strong.  Central  Banker,  Brookings,  lJashington,
19s8.
George l.I. Co1eman, "Legal  Reserve  Requirements, "  in  Herbert  V.  prochnow,  ed.,
The Federal  Reserve  S]rsten,  1990.
Davis  R.  Der+ey, Iinancial  Hlstorv  of  the  Unlted States, 5th  ed. ,  Longman'  s  ,
Green, and Co.,  New  york,  1915.
Dawid P.  Eastburn,  The Federal  Reserve  on Record,  Federal  Reserve  Bank of
Philadelphia,  196  5  .
Fair,  Ray C.,  Specification.  Estlrnation.  and Analysis  of  Macroeconornic  Models,
Haward  University  press,  Cambrldge,  1984.
Federal  Reserve  Board,  Annual  Reoorts,  various  issues,  I.Iashlngton.
Banking and Moneuary Statistics.  1914-41, Washlngton, 1943.
The Federal  Reserve  Slrstem:  Purposes  and Functions,  7th  ed.,
Federal  Reserve  Board  Publicatlons  Services,  l.lashington,  1984.
"The  History  of  Reserve  Requirements  for  Banks in  the  United
JbStates,rr  Federal  Reserve Bulletin,  November  L938, 953-72.
"Review  of  the  Month,,' Federal  Reserve Bulletin. January  L9l7 ,  l-
,  "Proposed  Revlsion  of  Reserve  Requlrenents,  n Federal  Reserve
Bulletin,  April  1958,  428-29.
,  "Proposed  Revision  of  Reserve  Requi.renents , ,' Federal  Reserve
Bulletin,  April  1959,  369  -77  .
Milton  Friednan,  A Progran  for  Monetarv  Stability,  Fordham Univ.  press,  New
York,  1960.
and Anna J.  Schwartz,  A Monetarv  Historv  of  lhe  United  SEates.
1867-1960, Princeton  Univ.  press,  prlnceton,  NJ,  j.963.
carl  M'  Gambs  and Robert  H,  Rasche,  "cost  of  Reserves  and the  Relative  size  of
Membet and Nor:menber  Bank Demand  Deposits,"  Journal  of  Monetar.v
Economics, Nowember  1978. 715-33.
R.  Alton  Gilbert,  "Utillzation  of  Federal  Reserve  Bank Servlces  by  Menber
Banks:  lnplications  for  the  Costs  and Benefits  of  Mernbership,  "  Federal
Reserve Bank of  St.  Louls  Review, august  1977, 2-L5.
Carter  Glass,  An Adventure  1n Constructive  Finance,  Doubleday,  page and Co.,
New  York,  1927.
Stephen M.  Goldfeld,  Commercial Bank Behawior  and Economic Activitv,  North-
HoIIand,  Ansterdam, 1966.
Marvln  Goodfrlend  and Monica  Hargraves,  ,,A Historical  Assessnent  of  the
Rationales  and Functions  of  Reserve  Requirements, "  Federal  Reserve  Bank
of  Richrnond  Annual Reoort.  1982, February L983, 5-23.
William  Greider,  Secrets  of  the  Tenple,  S  irnon and Schuster,  New york,  19g7,
Eray  Harnmond,  "Banking  befote  the  Civil  I,Iar,  "  in  Deane Carson,  ed.,  Banklng
and Monetarlr  Studies,  Rlchard  D.  Irwin,  Homewood,  IL,  1963.
Alvin  H.  Hansen,  ,'Bankers and Subsidies,,,  Rev.  of  Econ.  and  Stat.,  February
1958, s0-  51.
1,I.P.G. Harding,  The Formative  period  of  the  Federal  Reserve Svstern, Houghton
Mifflin,  Bosron, 1925.
4.
Albert  G. Hart,  "The 'Chicago plan,  of  Banklng Reforn,"  2 Rev.  of  Econ.
Studies,  February 1935, 104-  116  .
F.A.  Hayek, Denational ization  of  Money, 2d ed.,  Institute  of  Economic  Affairs,
London. 1978.Jack Hirshleifer,  "Conment,n 19 J.  of  Law and Econ.,  August  1-916,  24I-44.
Hyrnans, Saul  H.,  Joan  P.  Crary,  E.  Phllip  Howrey and Janet  C.  i.iolfe,  'The
Michigan  Quarterly  Econonetric  Model",  Research  Seminar  in  Quantitative
Econonics,  Department  of  Economics,  Universlty  of  Michigan.  June  1989.
lra  Kaminow,  "Required  Reserve  Ratios,  Policy  Instruments,  and Money Stock
Control,n  3 J. -of  Monetaf.v  Econ.,  October 1977,  389-408.
Thomas P.  Kane,  The Rornance  and Tragedy  of  Banking:  Problens  and Incidents  of
Governmental  Supervision  of  Natlonal  Banks,  Bankers  Publishing  Co.,  New
\oxk.  L922.
H.N.S.  Karunatilake,  The Variable  Reserve  Ratlo  as  an  Instrument  of  Central
Bank Policv,  Central  Bank of  Ceylon,  Colonbo,  1963.
T.P.  KetLell,  "The Money  of  Conmerce," 6 De Bow,s Review, October L848,  26L.
Benj  arlin  Klein,  "Conpetitive  Interest  Paynents  on Bank DeposLts  and  Ehe Long-
tun  Demand  for  Money,  "  64 Amer.  Econ.  Rev.  Decernber 1974,  93L-49.
"The Conpetitive  Supply of  Money," 6 J.  of  Money. Credit  and
Banklns,  Novenber  1974,  423-  53  .
Gabriel  Kolko,  The Triumph  of  Conservatism:  A Reinterpretation  of  American
History.  1900-1915,  Free Press, Glenco, IL,  1953.
Herman E.  Krooss,  ed.,  Documentarl/ llistory  of  Bankins  and Currency  in  the
United  States,  4 vo1s.,  Chelsea House and McGraw-Hill,  New  York,  1959.
Dawid E.W. Laidler,  The Demand  for  Monev,  3d ed.,  Harper  and Row, New York,
1985.
J.  Lawrence  Laughlin,  The Federal  Reserve  Act:  Its  Oriqin  and Problens ,
Macnillan,  New  York,  1933.
Arthur  S.  Link,  Wilson:  The New Freedon,  Princeton  Univ.  Press,  Princeton,
NJ. 1956.
Randall  C.  Merris  and John H.  Wood, ',A Deregulated  Rerun:  Banking  in  the
Eighties,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Chicago  Econonic  Perspectives,
Septenber/october  1985, 69-79.
Frederic  S.  Mlshkin,  The Econornics of  Mone]r. Banking.  and Financial
Markets,  Second  edition,  Scott,  Foresman  and Co.,  Glenview,  IL.,
1989.
Harry E.  Miller,  Bankine  Theories  ln  the  United  States  before 1860,Harvard
Univ.  Press,  Cambridge, 1927.
Geofftey  H.  Moore,  Business  Cycles.  Tnflation.  and
38
Forecastinq, BalIlnger,Canbridge,  MA, 1980.
Ceorge R.  Morrlson,  Llquiditv  Preferences  of  ConnercLal  Banks,  University  of
Chlcago Press,  Chlcago,  L966.
MarBaret  G.  Myers,  The New York  Mone]r  Market,  Vol.  I,  Origins  snd  Developnent,
Columbla Univ.  Press,  NY, 1931_.
National  City  Bank of  New York,  -Curbs  on Credit,"  Monthly  Letter  on Economic
Conditlons  and Government Finance,  September L948,  99-L03.
New York  Clearing  House Association,  @,  New
York,  1953.
Frank  E.  Norton  and Neil  H.  Jacoby,  Bank Deposits  and Leeal  Reserve
Requirenents,  UCLA  Graduate  School  of  Business  Administration,  Los
Angeles, 1959.
Alexander  D.  Noyes,  Fortv  Years  of  American  Finance.  1865-1907,  Putnam's,  New
York,  1909.
D.K.  Osborne, "Cartel  Problens,,'  66 Arnerlcan Econornic  Revlew, Decenber 1976,
835  -  44.
Sam  Peltzman,  "Entry  in  Comrnercial Banking,,'  8 J.  of  Law and Econ.,  October
1955, 11-  50.
"Toward  a More General  Theory  of  Regulation,  "  19 J,  of  Law and
Econ.  ,  Augus  t  L976, 2IL-40.
Richard  A.  Posner,  "Theories  of  Economic Regularion,  "  5 !.C1!_.1=_Sf_  fgsn  _
Mgt.  Sci.,  Autunn 1974,  225-58.
Herbert  B.  Prochnow,  ed.,  The Federal  Reserve  Svstem,  Harper  and Brothers,  New
York,  1960.
Ross M.  Robertson,  The Compttoller  and Bank Supervision:  A Historical
Aopraisal,  Conptroller  of  the  Currency,  Washington,  1958.
R.G.  Rodkey,  Lesal  Reserves  in  American  Banklnq,  Mlchlgan  Business  Studies,
VI ,  no.  5,  Univ.  of  Michigan,  1934.
Warren  L.  Snith,  "The  Instrunents  of  General  Monetary  Control,"  National
Bankine Review, Septenber L963, 4j-76.
o.M.W.  Sprague,  History  of  Crises  Under  the  Natlonal  BanktnE  Systen,  for  the
National  Monetary  Corunission,  Goverfflent  Printing  Office,  Washlngton,
1910.
Dennls  R.  Starleaf,  "Nonmenber Banks and Monetary  Control,"  Journal  of
Finance,  September  1915,  955-75.
39George J.  Stigler,  "The T'heory of  Econonic  Regulation,',  2 &.11_J-__Sf__E9-Sn-_-&
Man. Sci.,  Spring 1971, 3-21.
,  and Claire  Friedland.  "What Can Regulators  Regulate?  The
Case of  Electricity,"  5 J.  of  Law and Econ.,  October L962,  L-I5.
Charles  S.  Tippetts,  State  Banks and the  Federal  Reserve  SJfstem, Colunbia
Univ.  Press,  New  York,  l_929.
Tobin,  I'Cornnercial  Banks as  Creators  of  Money,"  in  Deane Carson,  ed.,  Banking
and Monetarv Studles,  Richard  D.  Irwin,  Inc.,  Homerrood,  I1.,  1953.  pp.
408-419.
U.S.  Congress,  Senate-House  Conference  Report,  Member Bank Reserve
Requirements, House Report No, 651,  86th  Congress, lst  Sesslon,
PauI  M. Warburg,  The Federal  Reserve  Systen:  Its  Orl&Lns  and crowth,  2 vols.,
Macrolllan,  New  York,  1930.
Eugend N.  Whi-te,  The Regulation  and Reform of  the  American  Banking  Svstem.
1900-1929, Princeton  Unlv.  Press,  Princeton,  NJ,  1983.
Lawrence H.  White,  Free  Bankinq  in  Britain:  Tteory.  Experience.  and Debate.
1800-1845, Carrbridge  Univ.  Press,  Cambrldge, 1984.
John  H.  Wood and Norna  L.  Wood, Financial  Msrkets,  Harcourt  Brace  Jovanovich,
San  Diego, 1985.
40Figure  1
Rdserves  as a Percentage  of Deposits  (A/Da),
the Commercial  Paper  Rate  (R),  and Reserve












Time  and Savings  Deposits  as a Percentage
of Total  Commercial  Bank Deposits  (t),












(fiRESEARCH PAPERS OF  THE  RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF  DALI,AS
Available,  at  no  charge,  from  the  Research  Department
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Dallas,  Station  K
Dallas,  Texas  75222
8801  Estinating  the  Impact  of  Monetary  Policy  on  Short-Tern  lnterest  Rates
in  a  Rational  Expectations-  -Xfficient  Markets  Model:  Further  Ewidence
(Kenneth  J.  Robinson  and  Eugenie  D.  Short)
8802  Exchange  and  lnterest  Rate  Management  and  the  International
Transmission  of  Disturbances  (W.  Michael  Cox  and  Douglas  McTaggart)
8803  Theoretical  Macroeconomi.c  Modelling  and  Qualltative  Specifications  of
the  Bond  Market  (William  R.  Russell  and  Joseph  H.  Haslag)
8804  Augmented  Information  in  a  Theory  of  Artbiguity,  Credibility  and
Inflation  (Nathan  Balke  and  Joseph  H.  Haslag)
8805  Investment  and  the  Norninal  Interest  Rate  The  Variable  Velocity  Case
(  Ewan F.  Koenig)
8806  Tax  Policy  and  Texas  Economlc  Development  (Stephen  P.A.  Bror^m)
8807  Unionization  and  Unemployment  Rates:  A  Re-Examination  of
Olson's  Labor  Cartelization  Hypothesis  (WiIIian  C.  Gruben)
8808  The  Developrnent  and  Uses  of  Regional  Indexes  of  Leading  Eeonomic
Indicators  (Keith  R.  Phillips)
8809  The  Contribution  of  Nonhomothetic  Prefereuces  to  Trade  (Linda
Hunter)
8810  Evidence  on  the  Two Monetary  Base  Measures  and  Econonic  Activity
(Joseph  H.  Haslag  and  Scorr  E.  Hein)
8811  The  Incidence  of  Sanctions  Against  U.S.  Employers  of  Illegal  Aliens
(John  K.  HilI  and  Jaxnes E.  Pearce)
8901  An  Econometric  Analysis  of  U.S.  Oi1  Dex0and (Stephen  P.A.  Brown  and
Keith  R.  Phillips)
8902  Further  Evidence  on  the  Liquidity  Effect  Using  an  Effici.ent  -Markets
Approach  (Kenneth  J.  Robinson  and  Eugenie  D.  Short)
8903  Aslflunetric  fnforuation  and  the  Role  of  Fed  Watching  (Nathan  Balke  and
Joseph  H.  Haslag)
8904  Federal  Reserve  Systen  Reserve  Requirenents:  1959-88--A  Note  (Joseph
H.  Haslag  and  Scolt  E.  Hein)
8905  Stock  Returns  and  Inflation:  Further  Tests  of  the  Proxy  and  Debt-
Monetization  Hypothesis  (David  EIy  and  Kenneth  J.  Robinson)8906  Real  Money Balances  and the  Tirning  of  Consumption:  An Empirical
Investigation  (  Evan F.  Koenig)
8907  The Effects  of  Financial  Deregulation  on  Inflatlon,  velocity  Crowth,
and Monetary  Targetlng  (1,I.  Michael  Cox and Joseph  H.  Haslag)
8908  Daylight  Overdrafts:  Who Really  Bears  the  Rlsk?  (Robert  T.  Clair)
8909  Macroeconomic Policy  and  Incoroe Inequality:  An Error  -  Correc tion
Repfesentation  (Joseph H. Haslag and Daniel  J.  SlottJe)
8910  The Clearing  House Interbank  Pa)rments  systen:  A Description  of  Its
Operations  and Risk  Managerlent (Robert  T.  Clair)
8911  Are  Reserve  Requirement  Changes Really  Exogenous?  An Exarnple of
Regulatory  Acconmodatlon  of  Industry  Goals  (Cara  S.  Lown and John  H.
t,lood )